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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relative importance of hot money in bank credit and portfolio flows 
from the US to 18 emerging markets over the period 1988-2012. We deploy state-space models 
à la Kalman filter to identify the unobserved hot money as the temporary component of each 
type of flow.  The analysis reveals that the importance of hot money relative to the permanent 
component in bank credit flows has significantly increased during the 2000s relative to the 
1990s. This finding is robust to controlling for the influence of push and pull factors in the two 
unobserved components. The evidence supports indirectly the view that global banks have 
played an important role in the transmission of the global financial crisis to emerging markets, 
and endorses the use of regulations to manage international capital flows. 
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“When one region of the world economy experiences a financial crisis, the world-wide availability 
of investment opportunities declines. As global investors search for new destinations for their 
capital, other regions will experience inflows of hot money. However, large capital inflows make 
the recipient countries more vulnerable to future adverse shocks, creating the risk of serial financial 
crises.”  (Korinek, 2011) 
1. Introduction 
International capital flows increased dramatically in the 1990s and it has been argued that they 
eventually led to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998; Kaminsky, 
1999; Chari and Kehoe, 2003). International capital flows resurged again until the late 2000s 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Global capital flows increased rapidly from less than 7% of 
world GDP in 1998 to over 20% in 2007, but suffer large reversals in late 2008, with bank 
credit flows being hit the hardest (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Tong and Wei, 2011; Forbes 
and Warnock, 2012).  Is this reversal of global capital flows due to hot money? 
The term hot money has been most commonly used for capital moving from one country 
to another in order to earn a short-term profit on interest rate differentials or anticipated 
exchange rate shifts. This speculative capital can lead to market instability (Martin and 
Morrison, 2008; Chari and Kehoe, 2003). 1  Recently, the equity premium has been suggested 
as a driver of hot money (Guo and Huang, 2010). Instead of ascertaining driving factors, some 
studies have sought to identify hot money via the unobserved-component models by focusing 
on its temporariness and reversibility aspects (see, e.g, Sarno and Taylor, 1999a, b).  
A surge in hot money to emerging markets (EMs) may be destabilizing and trigger 
regulation, of which examples abound since 2009 such as Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Indonesia and Thailand among other countries. Thus, measuring hot money becomes crucial 
for appropriate policy design (IMF, 2011; Ostry et al., 2010; McCauley 2010; Korinek, 2011).  
It is well known that distinct types of capital flows have distinct degrees of reversibility 
(Tong and Wei, 2011; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a).2  In fact, a key feature of the post-1990s trend 
                                                        
1 Huge movements of hot money have been historically not atypical in fixed exchange rate systems (e.g., during 
the final years of the Bretton Woods system). Recently, there is a growing interest on carry trade, seen as a type 
of hot money (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2009; McCauley, 2010; McKinnon, 2013; McKinnon and Liu, 2013).  
2 It is usually referred as the composition hypothesis. The rationale is that a more volatile form of capital will be 
more likely to fly out of the country in crisis. Tong and Wei (2011) do not find a connection between a country’s 
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in capital flows to EMs up until the GFC is the dramatic resurgence of international bank credit 
flows relative to equity and bond flows (Bank for International Settlements, 2009; Goldberg 
2009). Using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistics, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) 
show that the holdings of cross-border bank credit at year-end has increased notably, especially, 
during 2000-2007 and reached about 60% of world GDP. Thus, banking flows were hit the 
hardest compared to other types of capital flows during the GFC (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 
2011). It is also recognized that the recent bank globalisation process has played a major role 
in the GFC transmission (Aiyar, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, 2012a,b; De Haas and 
Van Horen, 2013; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012).  
Such recent developments in international capital flows and especially in bank credit flows 
raise questions such as whether the banking sector played a key role in the transmission of the 
crisis to emerging markets as the literature on bank globalisation suggests. Related to that is 
the question how the relative amount of hot money in bank credit, and portfolio (equity and 
bond) flows has evolved in recent years, particularly, in the run-up to the late 2000s GFC?  
This paper takes up the latter question by probing whether the relative importance of hot 
money in bank credit and portfolio flows to EMs has changed over the 1988-2012 period. We 
start by deploying  unobserved component (or state-space) models à-la Kalman filter to gauge 
the temporariness of international capital flows from the US to 9 Asian countries and 9 Latin 
American countries which have attracted substantial capital flows over period the 1988 to 1997. 
We are able to confirm the earlier findings of Sarno and Taylor (1999a, b) over a similar time 
period and using a similar methodology. On average in the 1988-1997 period, portfolio flows 
(i.e., equity and bond flows) were largely temporary but, in contrast, bank credit is found to be 
more permanent than temporary. This supports the widely held view that hot money in portfolio 
flows played a key role in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Reestimating the models over the full sample period from 1988 to 2012 our results reveal 
                                                        
exposure to capital flows and the extent of the liquidity crunch experienced by its manufacturing firms when they 
just include total volumes of capital inflows. However, they argue this masks an important compositional effect, 
as a different but consistent pattern emerges when they disaggregate capital flows into three types (FDI, foreign 
portfolio flows and foreign loans). This empirical evidence suggests that aggregating different capital flows may 
not be appropriate when one wishes to understand the connection between capital flows and a liquidity crunch in 
a crisis. See also Neumann et al. (2009) and Levchenko and Mauro (2007). 
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an important change: bank credit has gradually become more temporary in the recent decade, 
while the temporariness of portfolio flows has stayed roughly the same. Third, since the change 
of sample periods brings about completely different results for bank credit, we deploy the 
models over the recent sub-sample, 1998 to 2012, and the results confirm that bank credit has 
a marked temporary component. The dramatic resurgence of international bank credit in this 
recent decade broadly coincides with the period of banking sector globalization.  
We provide additional evidence on the temporariness of the capital flows by estimating 
‘structural’ state-space models which include global (push) and domestic (pull) macro factors 
as potential drivers of both latent components, permanent and transitory. This constitutes a 
methodological novelty and can be motivated as an attempt to incorporate fundamentals (i.e., 
adding some economic ‘structure’ to the state-space decomposition) in the unobserved 
components analysis of capital flows. To our knowledge, no previous study that assesses the 
importance of the temporary (vis-à-vis the permanent) part of international capital flows has 
deployed ‘structural’ state-space models that control for push/pull factors.  Altogether the 
empirical analysis in the paper is intended to provide robust evidence on the relative importance 
of the temporary (hot money) and permanent components of capital flows. 
Our finding of high temporariness in bank credit, equity and bond flows over the most 
recent decade suggests that all three types of capital flows have been dominated by hot money 
and hence, prone to large reversals. Thus, the paper provides indirect supporting evidence that 
hot money is a channel of crisis transmission and, most importantly, that global banks might 
have played an important role in the transmission of the recent financial crisis to emerging 
markets. Thus our analysis reinforces the main contention in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) on 
the role of bank lending in the GFC transmission. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides some background literature. Sections 3 
and 4 outline the data and empirical methodology, respectively. The empirical results are 
discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
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2. Background Literature 
 
Our paper relates to two strands of the literature. It directly draws upon studies that seek to 
identify ‘hot money’ in bank credit and/or portfolio flows. It is also linked, albeit more 
indirectly, with studies investigating the mechanisms of transmission of the late 2000s GFC. 
One intriguing question about the GFC is how the US Subprime Crisis engulfed the entire 
world.3 Initially, it was hoped that emerging markets (EMs) would stay unscathed as reforms 
were designed to insulate their economies from adverse foreign shocks (Kamin and DeMarco, 
2012). These hopes evaporated by the fall of 2008 when many EMs without direct exposure to 
the ‘toxic’ assets, which were at the root of the financial crisis in advanced economies 
experienced sharp declines both in output and equity markets (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).  
The literature has identified various channels of cross-country transmission of financial 
turmoil: i) through tangible real and/or direct financial linkages (e.g., trade, portfolio 
investment and bank loans), ii) through reassessment of fundamentals (e.g., wake-up calls), iii) 
through market sentiment (e.g., self-fulfilling panic).4 Hot money in portfolio flows has been 
shown to play a key role in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; 
Kaminsky, 1999; Sarno and Taylor, 1999b; Chari and Kehoe, 2003).  
More recent papers have attempted to shed light on the global incidence of the GFC. 
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) show that the turnaround for international capital flows has 
been much sharper than that for trade flows. Fratzscher (2009) analyzes the global transmission 
of the GFC via exchange rates. Acharya and Schnabl (2010) relate the incidence of the GFC to 
the issuance of asset-backed commercial paper. Ehrmann et al. (2009) assess stock market 
comovement in a sample of EMs and industrial economies, and find that macro risk dwarfed 
micro risk. Eichengreen et al. (2012) study the evolution of CDS spreads for 45 global banks 
and find that common factors became more important during of the crisis.  
Theoretical models have been developed to show how crises in one area of the world 
                                                        
3 Securities backed by subprime mortgages account only for about 3% of US financial assets (Eichengreen et al., 
2012). Kamin and DeMarco (2012) examine whether industrial countries that held large amounts of US mortgage-
backed securities experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the GFC but find no evidence of such 
direct spillovers. 
4 For reviews of the various channels of crisis transmission, see Kamin and DeMarco (2012) and Forbes (2012). 
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economy prompt hot money to flow into other areas (Korinek, 2011). However, there is no 
well-defined direct method for identifying the amount of hot money flowing into a country 
during a certain period. A widely-used tool is accounting labels. Hot money is traditionally 
defined as speculative or short-term international capital flows but it is difficult to track the 
(non)speculative nature of capital flows; the only measurable key characteristic of hot money 
has been its short-term aspect, especially before the 1990s. The balance-of-payment statistics 
of the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury sub-categorize various types of capital flows as short-
term and long-term using one year as the typical threshold. Thus, any capital flowing into a 
country and staying there for more than a year is categorized as ‘not hot money’.  
Claessens et al. (1995) raises scepticism about the information value of accounting labels. 
Typically, the notion that short-term flows are more volatile than long-term flows is based on 
the fact that short-term-maturity inflows need to be repaid more quickly than long-term inflows. 
Although rapid repayment may lead to higher volatility of gross short-term flows, it need not 
make net flows more volatile. Short-term flows that are rolled over are equivalent to long-term 
assets, and a disruption of gross FDI inflows, for example, can cause its net flow to be 
equivalent to a repayment of a short-term flow. Their analysis suggests that the “short-term” 
and “long-term” accounting labels of capital flows do not provide a reliable indication of their 
degree of temporariness or reversibility. Levchenko and Mauro (2007) show that, under 
accounting labels, differences across types of flows are limited with respect to volatility, 
persistence, cross-country comovement, and correlation with growth at home and worldwide. 
However, consistent with conventional wisdom, FDI is the least volatile form of financial flow, 
particularly, during episodes of sudden stops; portfolio debt flows and, to a greater extent, bank 
flows and trade credits, mostly account for the latter. 
Focusing instead on the time-series properties of observed capital flows, state-space 
models are utilized by Sarno and Taylor (1999a) to compare the size of their permanent and 
temporary components during the period 1988-1997. They find a significant temporary-to-
permanent ratio in equity and bond flows, but not so in bank credit. Following this lead, Sarno 
and Taylor (1999b) find associations between stock market bubbles and sudden reversals of 
private portfolio flows, instead of bank credit and FDI, during the 1997 East Asian financial 
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crisis. They conclude that hot money in bank credit played a minor role in the latter. The 
rationale is that the terms of bank loans are usually fixed and the profitability of the 
corresponding bank will be seriously jeopardised if lending is suddenly withdrawn.  
However, the recent literature about rollover risk (Acharya et al., 2011; He and Xiong, 
2012) supports a different view.  Precisely because the terms of bank loans are fixed and their 
prices do not adjust automatically, private banks prefer to sign very short-term contracts. Once 
there are signs of financial distress, banks adjust the quantity of lending, for instance, by not 
rolling-over existing contracts or even retrieving previous loans. This literature concludes that 
private banks are very sensitive to short-term uncertainty and risk, and bank loans become 
much more reversible and volatile in crisis periods than in normal periods.  
Based on this idea and the unprecedented resurgence of cross-border bank credit in the era 
of banking sector globalisation, there is growing support for the view that bank lending played 
a major role in the transmission of the GFC. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) provide evidence 
in this regard using a cross-section of industrialized countries and a broad panel of EMs. 
Focusing on syndicated loans, Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that banks exhibit a strong 
home bias during crises which materializes in a significant decrease in the proportion of foreign 
loans and a reduction in the extension of new loans.5  
None of the above papers studies the temporariness (or ‘hot money’ component) of bank 
credit flows from the US to EMs in the new century. This is an important task given the 
background of the banking sector globalisation and the GFC.  Our paper fills this gap. 
3. Description of Variables and Preliminary Data Analysis 
3.1 Capital Flows  
We employ data on US capital flows to 9 Asian and 9 Latin American countries from January 
1988 to December 2012. 6 The Asian countries are Mainland China, Taiwan China, India, 
                                                        
5 Various microeconomic studies document a significant transmission of bank liquidity shocks to EMs; see, for 
instance, Khwaja and Mian (2008) for Pakistan, and Schnabl (2012) for Peru. 
6 Of more relevance for the purposes of this paper is the distinction between two definitions of hot money: de jure 
hot money, which is generally associated with accounting labels and based solely on data categories given in 
balance-of-payments statistics, and de facto hot money, which focuses on the temporary time-series properties of 
respective capital flows (Agosin and Huaita, 2011). This paper focuses on the latter definition. 
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Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand. The Latin American 
countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.7 According to World Bank (2011) statistics, as of 2010 these markets represent 23 
per cent of the world GDP and over 70 per cent of the GDP of the 150 EMs listed by the IMF. 
We use monthly data on US portfolio (equity and bond) flows in US$ millions to EMs 
collected from the US Treasury International Capital (TIC) database.8 As previous studies, we 
use a net measure of equity flows and a gross measure of bond flows. The main motivation for 
using gross bond flows is to abstract from the effect of sterilization policy actions and other 
types of reserve operations by the monetary authorities (Chuhan et al., 1998; Taylor and Sarno, 
1997; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Sarno et al., 2014).  The TIC 
database reports “gross purchases by foreigners” which we classify as US sales and “gross 
sales by foreigners” which we classify as US purchases. We employ quarterly data on US bank 
credit flows to EMs which is obtained from the US Treasury Bulletin.9  
Our analysis of capital flows is based on data over the 24-year period from 1988 to 2012. 
This allows us to replicate the analysis for the 1990s conducted by Sarno and Taylor (1999a), 
and to investigate further whether the role of ‘hot money’ in bank credit, equity and bond flows 
has experienced any significant change thereafter. Since the capital flows are expressed in US 
dollars, we scale them by the US consumer price index (CPI) from Datastream to control for 
any inflationary effects. We also conduct the analysis on the un-scaled capital flows, and the 
(unreported but available upon request) results are broadly similar in line with the fact that US 
inflationary pressures have been rather limited over the sample period. 
Our data allows us to measure not only traditional banking linkages (direct cross-border 
                                                        
7 These are the same countries considered in Sarno and Taylor (1999a) and Chuhan et al. (1998). 
8 The US international portfolio investment transactions are tracked by the Department of Treasury (DOT), the 
International Capital Form S reports and the International Capital Form B reports. Operationally, the 12 district 
Federal Reserve Banks, principally the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, maintain contact with the respondents, 
and ensure the accuracy and integrity of the information provided (Kester, 1995). The DOT compiles the data and 
publishes in its Quarterly Bulletin. This database has been widely used in the international finance literature (e.g. 
Tesar and Werner, 1994, 1995; Bekaert et al., 2002).  Appendix A provides further details. 
9 The US Treasury Bulletin compiles data on foreign claims as reported by US banks and other depository 
institutions, brokers and dealers. Data on bank claims held for their own account are collected monthly. A 
comprehensive sample on bank credit flows (e.g., including domestic customer claims and foreign currency claims) 
is only available quarterly; see section on Capital Movements, Table CM-II-2 and Table CM-III-2. 
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lending) but also indirect ones through an affiliate in the borrower’s country (internal capital 
market). Cross-border lending is a well-known channel of transmission. However, there is 
recent evidence that banks are setting up branches and subsidiaries in foreign locations to serve 
clients (Forbes, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a, b). Applying basic corporate finance 
principles, it has been conjectured that global banks can respond to a funding shock by 
activating capital markets internal to the organization, reallocating funds across locations in 
response to their relative needs. Peek and Rosengren (1997), show how the drop in Japanese 
stock prices in 1990 could lead Japanese bank branches in the US to reduce credit. Cetorelli 
and Goldberg (2012a) provide evidence of actual cross border, intra-bank funding flows 
between global banks’ head offices and their foreign operations in response to domestic shocks. 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b) confirm the existence of an active cross-border, internal capital 
market and show high heterogeneity across branches in lending response.  
Our data choices are geared towards capturing financial transactions that involve both a 
US resident and a foreign resident; a US resident includes any individual, corporation, or 
organization (including branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign entities) located in the 
US. In addition, any entity incorporated in the US system is considered a US resident even if 
it has no physical presence. Thus, a US branch of a Japanese bank is considered a US resident, 
and a London branch of a US bank is considered a foreign resident.10  
The cross-border definition means that the data on foreign purchases of US securities 
include only those transactions that involve both a US seller and a foreign purchaser. These 
data exclude US-to-US transactions, e.g. transactions where the seller is a US securities broker 
and the purchaser is a US-based branch of a Japanese securities firm. They also exclude 
foreign-to-foreign transactions in securities, e.g. a purchase by a Japanese-resident broker of 
US Treasuries from a London-based broker. Appendix A provides further details. 
3.2 Preliminary Data Analysis 
We begin by plotting the time-series of net equity, net bond and net bank credit flows to Asian 
                                                        
10 These data provide an unusual opportunity for a direct test of the existence of an internal capital market, since 
data on borrowing and lending within an organization is generally not available to researchers.  
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and Latin American countries from 1988 to 2012 in Figure I. The vertical axis represents 
US$ millions and the horizontal axis is quarters. Several interesting observations can be made. 
First, in the 21st century, bank credit surged and significantly dwarfed the equity and bond flows. 
Second, in both Asia and Latin America, the volatility of bond flows and bank credit flows 
increased significantly in the 21st century, especially in the run-up to and during the late 2000s 
GFC. Third, it is the bank credit flows, instead of portfolio flows, that suffered the sharpest 
reversal during the GFC. These patterns in capital flows in the 2000s seem quite different from 
the ones in the 1990s, and raise key questions concerning the temporariness (i.e., hot money) 
in each category of capital flows in the recent decade. 
Table I provides summary statistics for net bank credit flows, net equity flows and gross 
bond flows from the US to emerging markets over the period 1988-2012.11 The ADF unit root 
test results broadly confirm that bank credit and bond flows have a unit root. However, the 
evidence for equity flows is less clearcut as the tests suggest non-stationarity over the early 
sample period of Sarno and Taylor (1999a) but stationarity over the full sample. Since there is 
no economic theory to suggest that equity flows have a drastically different data generating 
process from bank and credit flows, following the extant literature we conceptualize all three 
flows as realizations from first-difference stationary processes.12 Hence, it makes sense to 
gauge the relative importance of their permanent and stationary components. 
All three categories of capital flows to Asia surpass in size those to Latin America over 
the period under study. For most countries, the average net bank credit flows are negative, 
meaning that the US has been on the whole ‘financed’ by EMs in this category of capital. 
Average net equity flows are positive for all Asian countries but, in sharp contrast, mostly 
negative for Latin American countries (with the exception of Brazil, which shows a relatively 
                                                        
11 As mentioned earlier we use a net measure of equity flows and a gross measure of bond flows to abstract from 
the effect of sterilization policy actions and other types of reserve operations by the monetary authorities (Chuhan 
et al., 1998; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Sarno and Taylor, 1999a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Sarno et al., 2012). 
Appendix B provides summary statistics for net bond flows. 
12 Our methodology for the analysis of capital flows rests on the assumption that the dynamics of their unobserved 
persistent component can be approximated by a random walk model. However, as borne out by the mixed results 
of the unit root tests, other specifications could be plausible alternatives such as those in the autoregressive 
fractionally integrated moving average class known as ARFIMA models that can generate very persistent 
(non)stationary data. The random walk process is adopted because it is rather parsimonious (which helps in 
identification) and to ensure comparability with the prior literature (see e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 1999a). 
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large positive average net equity flow in contrast to all other Latin American countries, and 
Argentina to a lesser extent). Thus, over the sample period the US has financed all Asian EMs 
but only two Latin American countries (Brazil by a large amount, and Argentina) via net equity 
flows. However, the size of bank credit flows belittles the size of equity flows. Finally, capital 
flows to Asia appear more volatile than the flows to Latin America in all categories.  
4. State-Space Models 
Our analysis of the dynamics of capital flows is based on state-space (or unobserved 
components) models. One benefit of representing a dynamic system in state space form is that 
unobserved variables can be incorporated and estimated along with the observable variables. 
State space models have been widely used in economics to model latent variables such as 
(rational) expectations, permanent income and unobserved components such as trends and 
cycles. State-space models will allow us to decompose the observed bank, equity and bond 
flows into unobserved permanent and temporary components as it is explained next.  
Let ty  denote the observed capital flow for a given country at time t. The unobserved 
components formulation of the capital flow is as follows  
t t t ty v    ,   t=1, . . . ,T                                                        (1) 
where t  denotes the unobserved permanent (non-stationary) part of the flows, and it itv   the 
unobserved temporary (stationary) part with a mean-reverting part itv   and an irregular 
(unpredictable) white noise part  it   ~
2
,. . . (0, ) ii i d N  . The permanent (stochastic trend) 
component is commonly modelled as a random walk (RW) process  
1t t tc                                                                                (2) 
where c represents the drift, and t ~
2. . . (0, )i i d N  is a white noise random error. The temporary 
component itv  is modelled as an order-two autoregressive (AR) process  
1 1 2 2t t t tv v v                                                                           (3) 
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with coefficients (𝜌1 + 𝜌2) < 1, (𝜌1 − 𝜌2) < 1, |𝜌2| < 1 and error t ~
2. . . (0, )i i d N . 
Estimation of the unobserved components model is usually handled through a state-space 
decomposition. This involves writing a signal equation linking the state vector of unobserved 
variables '( , , )t t tv   to the observed capital flow variable ty  as follows 
                                      1 1 1



 
 
  
 
 
t
t t
t
y ,                                                                         (4) 
and a transition equation describing the dynamics of the state variables   
                     
1
1
1
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

  
 
  



       
       
        
       
       
t t t
t t t
t t t
v v                           (5) 
The above equations can be written more compactly to express the model as 
                        t ty Hβ ,                                                                                      (6) 
                    1t t t β Fβ Rκ                                                                          (7) 
                                     2~ 0,κ Qt IN                                                                            
(8) 
for t=1, . . . ,T, where H  is a 13 unit vector, F , R and Q are 33 matrices, and tβ  is the 
unobservable 31 state vector. State-space models can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) using the recursive Kalman filter algorithm which is described in Appendix C. 
In order to gauge the relative role of the temporary and permanent components of capital 
flows, we employ the Q-ratio, a standard scalar measure in the state-space modelling literature 
(bounded between 0 and 1) whose inputs are the elements of the disturbance covariance matrix 
Q. For instance, the Q-ratio of the permanent component is defined as 
       - ( ) =
max( , , )

  


  
tQ ratio ,                     (9) 
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and the temporary component’s role is subsumed in - ( )tQ ratio   and - ( )tQ ratio   which are 
defined similarly. If most of the dynamics in the corresponding capital flow is due to the 
permanent component then we expect - ( ) =1tQ ratio   which implies that a large part of the 
capital flow remains in the country for an indeterminate period of time. Instead, if most of the 
variation in the capital flow is explained by the dynamics of the temporary component then 
- ( ) =1tQ ratio  or - ( ) =1tQ ratio   but this finding alone does not allow us to conclude that the 
capital flow is dominated by “hot money” because the temporary component could be highly 
persistent or slowly mean-reverting.  Hence, we need to assess the degree of persistence of the 
temporary component of the capital flows for each of the countries concerned.  
Many measures of persistence have been employed in the empirical finance literature and 
there is no consensus on which one is the most appropriate; see Dias and Marques (2005). The 
most popular measures are designed under the so-called univariate approach, namely, 
persistence is investigated by looking at the time-series representation of inflation. Following 
the latter, in our study a capital flow variable is judged as being dominated by “hot money” if 
two conditions are jointly met: i) the Q-ratio of the temporary component is 1, and ii) the half-
life of the temporary component is below one and a half years. As it is standard in the empirical 
finance literature, the half-life of a dynamic process is approximated by 1 2  ln( / ) / ln( )H  
where   is the sum of the coefficients of its AR representation. 
Appendix D lists the candidate state-space model specifications. We identify the most 
appropriate one per country i and category of capital flow using: i) the coefficient of 
determination                                        where d is the number of non-stationary elements in the 
state vector, and ii) the Akaike information criterion, AIC= log(PEV)+2(m/T), where PEV is 
the steady-state prediction error variance, m is the number of unknown parameters to estimate 
(the number of the variance parameters, together with damping factors for cycles and 
autoregressive coefficients) plus the number of non-stationary components in the state vector 
t , and T is the number of observations. For a detailed exposition, see Harvey (1989). 
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5. Empirical Results 
We begin by analyzing the state-space model estimates and diagnostics for bank credit flows 
in order to gauge the importance of ‘hot money’. Then we proceed similarly with the equity 
and bond flows. The analysis is conducted over the 1988-1997, 1997-2012 and full periods. 
 5.1 Reduced-form unobserved components model 
Hot Money in Bank Credit  
Has the amount of ‘hot money’ in bank credit flows become more relevant over the recent 
decade? To address this question, we discuss the state-space modelling results corresponding 
to the first subperiod (1988-1997), extended period (1988-2012) and most recent period (1998-
2012) which are shown in Table II, Panels A, B and C, respectively.  
Column 2 of the table notes the selected model specification among all the candidates 
considered (listed in Appendix A). The diagnostics shown in the last two columns suggest that 
the models provide a good fit: the coefficient of determination (R2) is fairly large, and the 
Ljung–Box statistic (p-value) fails to reject the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. 
 Columns 3-5 report the Q-ratios of the permanent (stochastic trend) component, and the 
temporary (AR and/or irregular) components. Column 6 reports the stochastic level in the final 
state vector and its root mean square error (RMSE); if the final stochastic level is significantly 
different from zero then we can conclude that, even if the Q-ratio of either of the temporary 
components is 1, there is a non-negligible permanent component. Column 7 shows the sum of 
the AR coefficients (or damping factor 1 2    ) whose proximity to 1 indicates the degree 
of persistence in the temporary component of the flows; equivalently, the (unreported) half-life 
of shocks to the temporary component is a nonlinear transformation of the damping factor, 
1 2  ln( / ) / ln( )H , which is expressed in units of time.  
The model estimates for bank credit over the period 1988-1997 suggest for all 18 EMs the 
permanent component explains most of the variation in the flows. Taking Mainland China as 
an example, the Q-ratio of the permanent component in Table II (Panel A) is equal to 1 and the 
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Q-ratio of the temporary component is 0.652. Hence, we conclude that bank credit flows to 
Asian and Latin American countries from 1988 to 1997 are largely permanent or persistent. 
These findings are well aligned with the empirical evidence in Sarno and Taylor (1999a). 
However, Table II (Panel B) tells a different story. Over the full sample period from 1988 
to 2012, the analysis of bank credit flows for both sets of countries suggests that the largest Q-
ratios correspond now instead to the temporary part of the flows, captured by the vector 
(𝑡, 𝜀𝑡)
′. Taking again Mainland China as an example in Table II (Panel B), the Q-ratio of the 
stochastic trend component 𝜇𝑡 is only 0.217. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to regard 
bank credit flows to Mainland China over the full sample period 1988-2012 as largely 
influenced by its temporary component which stands in sharp contrast with the evidence from 
similar state-space models estimated over the first subsample period 1988-1997. The 
contribution of the permanent (temporary) component to the total variation of capital flows is 
relatively small (large). The final level of the stochastic trend component 𝜇𝑡  is significant 
which, together with the Q-ratio, indicates that there is a non-negligible permanent component 
in bank credit flows, but it explains a small amount of the total time variation in bank credit 
relative to the temporary component. All countries considered, the dynamics of bank credit 
flows appear strikingly different over the pre-1990s and 1988-2012 periods.   
Thus we conjecture that the temporariness of bank credit flows to Asian and Latin 
American countries may have increased substantially in the recent decade, coinciding with the 
process of banking sector globalisation. To test this conjecture, we re-estimate the models over 
the second subsample period 1998-2012. The results are reported in Table II (Panel C). Bank 
credit shows now, in contrast to the 1988-1997 period, a large degree of temporariness. Taking 
again Mainland China as an example, the two conditions stated in the previous section are met, 
namely, the Q-ratio of the AR component is 1 and the corresponding half-life of shocks at 3.3 
quarters is low (below 6 quarters), implying that bank credit to Mainland China has become 
dominated by “hot money” over the most recent 15-year period. As clearly shown in Table II 
(Panel A), over the first subsample period 1988-1997 none of the countries meets the two 
conditions which allows us to conclude that banking flows are dominated by a permanent 
component pre-1990s in line with the prior literature. In sharp contrast, as Table II (Panel C) 
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shows, the same unobserved component models estimated post-1990s reveal that all countries 
except two (Argentina and Brazil with half-lives of 7 and 9 quarters, respectively) meet both 
conditions. This allows us to conclude that the relative role of “hot money” in bank credit has 
increased notably in the years leading to and during the GFC. 
Hot Money in Portfolio Flows  
Next we discuss the state-space model estimates and diagnostics for equity and bond flows 
which are reported in Tables III and IV, respectively. Again we deploy the models separately 
over the three sample periods: 1988-1997, 1988-2012, and 1998-2012. The coefficient of 
determination R2 for equity (bond) flows ranges from 0.012 to 0.901 (0.150 to 0.930) in the 
1988-1997 analysis and improves to between 0.05 and 0.929 (0.090 and 0.979) in the full 
sample analysis. The p-value from the Ljung–Box test uniformly for all 18 EMs and time 
periods rules out residual autocorrelation. 
In contrast to our findings for bank credit, the largest variance of the disturbances for 
portfolio flows is always the temporary component (either irregular or AR component) 
consistently across all sample periods. The Q-ratios for the stochastic level components are low 
 ranging from negligible for equity flows to Mainland China to a maximum of 0.968 for bond 
flows to Argentina  suggesting that the contribution of the persistent component in explaining 
the dynamics of capital flows is low relative to the temporary component. As borne out by the 
estimated coefficient of the stochastic level in the final state vector and the corresponding 
RMSE (shown in column 4), the permanent component is significant but it explains a relatively 
small proportion of the dynamics in the observed flows. Actually, if we compare the results for 
bank credit, equity flows and bond flows over the latter sub-sample from 1998 to 2012, there 
are large similarities regarding the degree of temporariness. Hence, all three categories of 
capital flows have in recent years attained a high degree of reversibility. Thus, it appears likely 
that they may have been a channel for the transmission of the GFC.  
Summing up, our findings thus far suggest that in the post-1997 era not only bond and 
equity flows but also bank credit flows to EMs are characterized by a ‘hot money’ component 
that is large relative to the permanent component; this means that all three types of capital flows 
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are plausible candidates as channels for the transmission of the GFC. Thus, bank credit surfaces 
as a new potential channel of crisis transmission given that it appears unlikely as channel of 
transmission of previous turmoils such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The finding of a 
high reversible component in bank credit flows to EMs is aligned with the recent literature 
about rollover risk, the banking sector globalisation and transmission of the GFC. 
5.2. Unobserved components model with push/pull factors  
A potential criticism of the reduced-form model on which the results thus far are based is that 
it lacks economic content. In order to shield our analysis from this criticism, we now 
reformulate the state-space models by incorporating one-period lagged macroeconomic factors 
as potential exogenous variables both in the permanent and temporary components of the flows.  
The aim is to impose some economic ‘structure’ to the state-space models with the purpose of 
adding robustness to our key finding that bank credit flows are newly characterized by a 
weighty temporary component (hot money) during the post-1997 era. Q-ratios thus computed 
from the covariance matrix Q of white noise residuals, account for the impact of the economic 
drivers. To our knowledge, no previous study that assesses the relative importance of the 
temporary (versus permanent) component of bank credit, equity and bond flows has deployed 
‘structural’ state-space models that control for push/pull factors.  Such models have been 
mainly used in the context of order flows and high-frequency trading (Menkveld et al., 2007; 
Brogaard et al., 2013; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014). 
We employ the following parsimonious state-space model with macro drivers  
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where Zj,t denotes the jth macroeconomic factor, and (𝑡 , 𝑡)′ are white noise error terms. The 
total number of push/pull factors, J, which cannot be too large due to degrees of freedom 
constraints in estimation; to illustrate, the inclusion of say J=5 factors in the state-space model 
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implies ten additional parameters to estimate.13  
This unobserved components model, equation (10), serves the purpose of addressing the 
potential criticism that the original model, equations (1) to (3), is a purely statistical 
decomposition of the flows into the latent temporary and permanent parts without any 
economic content. Instead, in this reformulation we extract the latent permanent and temporary 
components of the capital flows while controlling for various observed factors that have been 
shown in previous studies to be potential drivers. 
  Choosing an appropriate set of pull and push factors {Z1,t, Z2,t,…,ZJ,t} is a non-trivial task 
because they ought to be relevant drivers for both the permanent and temporary components. 
Earlier studies have considered investor-fear risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk as push 
(or global) factors, and depth of the financial system, real GDP growth, country indebtedness 
and capital controls as pull (or domestic) factors (see Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 
2012; Sarno, et al., 2013).  However, a parallel literature has suggested other push/pull factors, 
that we describe below, as important drivers of hot money.  We consider both sets in turn. 
Inspired by McKinnon (2013), McKinnon and Liu (2013), McKinnon and Schnabl (2009), 
Korinek (2011), and Martin and Morrison (2008), we begin by considering as candidates for 
push factors the US interest rate and US equity index; and as pull factors, the EM interest rate, 
EM equity index, and the exchange rate defined as units of EM currency per US dollar. Strictly 
speaking, however, since the exchange rate has a US side and an EM side, it can be categorized 
as either push or a pull factor. Both interest rates and the exchange rate have been extensively 
used as drivers in the literature on carry trade, which has been categorised as hot money.14 We 
include equity indices for two reasons. First, equity return differences in the US and EMs could 
trigger capital flows to globally re-allocate assets, either because of return-chasing or portfolio-
rebalancing motives (Bekaert et al., 2002). Second, the equity market is commonly seen as a 
                                                        
13 The above state-space model is an extension of the specification referred to as “Model 5” in Appendix D. It 
parsimoniously decomposes the flows into a permanent part and a temporary part without irregular components 
and drifts. After the inclusion of push or push and pull factors as explanatory variables, the irregular component 
and drifts decrease quickly, becoming insignificant. A similar model has been used in a different literature 
(Menkveld et al., 2007; Brogaard et al., 2013; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014).  
14 The carry trade is a popular currency trading strategy that invests in high-interest currencies by borrowing in 
low-interest currencies. This strategy is at the core of active currency management and is designed to exploit 
deviations from uncovered interest parity. 
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confidence barometer, with a sharp decline often preceding an economic crisis, which makes 
hot money in bank credit responsive to the dynamics of the equity market (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1998, 1999; Kaminsky, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  
Regarding our priors, we expect the US interest rate to impact negatively on capital flows 
from the US to EMs, while the interest rate in EMs ought to have a positive impact on capital 
flowing from the US to EMs. Since a lower exchange rate means an appreciation of the EM 
currency versus the US$ which may arguably attract capital flows into EMs, it is expected that 
the exchange rate has a negative impact on capital flows from the US to EMs.  
It is harder to form priors about the impact of the US and EMs stock markets on capital 
flows because the “return-chasing” and “portfolio-rebalance” hypotheses imply conflicting 
predictions (Bekaert et al., 2002). According to the return-chasing hypothesis, the performance 
of EMs (the US) stock markets influences positively (negatively) capital flows from the US to 
EMs because capital flows chase sizeable stock returns. In sharp contrast, according to the 
portfolio-rebalance hypothesis, the EMs (US) stock market performance affects negatively 
(positively) capital flows from the US to EMs because investors rebalance their investment 
portfolio to maintain their original (planned) asset allocation. 
Table V shows the estimation results for the ‘structural’ state-space models of bank flows 
using the above factors as lagged (exogenous) drivers over the sample period 1998-2012. Due 
to data constraints, we perform the analysis on 8 EMs in our sample. The main result that the 
temporary component (hot money) in bank credit flows is responsible for most of the variation 
in the flows remains unchallenged. For all 8 EMs, the Q-ratios indicate that the temporary 
component weighs more heavily than the permanent component, confirming the role of hot 
money during that period. India has the largest Q-ratio for the permanent component (0.929) 
across all 8 EMs, followed by Thailand (0.813), Brazil (0.391) and Chile (0.340), while the Q-
ratios of the permanent component for the other four EMs are close to 0.2. The R2 is generally 
high and the Ljung-Box test suggests no residual autocorrelation. 
Looking now at the coefficients of the push and pull factors, our results are consistent with 
the previous literature in that international capital flows are highly heterogeneous both over 
time and across countries (Milesi-Ferretti and Tile, 2011; Fratzscher, 2012; Warnock and 
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Forbes, 2012). For example, Fratzscher (2012) finds the effects of economic shocks on capital 
flows to be highly heterogeneous across countries, with a large proportion of the cross-country 
heterogeneity being ascribed to differences in the quality of domestic institutions, country risk 
and the strength of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals (pull factors). But he further shows 
that push factors were overall the main drivers of capital flows in the brunt of the GFC, while 
pull factors have become more dominant in the recent period 2009-2010, in particular, for EMs. 
Hence, there is evidence in the literature of both time and cross-country heterogeneity in the 
role of push/pull factors as drivers of capital flows. 
Regarding statistical significance, we find push and pull factors to be equally important; 
only marginally, push factors play a more dominant role than pull factors in the permanent 
component.15 The heterogeneity of the impact of push and pull factors across countries can be 
seen in the close examination of three of the BRIC countries in Sarno et al. (2014), where for 
China the importance of the pull factor is close to the world average, for India is much below 
the world average and for Brazil for bond flows is much higher than the world average. 
The signs of the push/pull factor coefficients are rather mixed in line with the large 
heterogeneity (over time and across countries) on the drivers of capital flows documented in 
the literature. In our context, it may relate to the fact that the sample includes both crisis and 
non-crisis periods. On the one hand, the effects of shocks on capital flows have changed 
markedly since the GFC erupted about seven years ago (Fratzscher, 2012). On the other hand, 
as it is pointed out in Forbes and Warnock (2012), the same factor may have a different effect 
on capital flows when capital flows are in different stages (Surge/Stop/Flight/Retrenchment).  
For completeness, we repeat the analysis for push and pull factors used in earlier work. The 
push factors are investor-fear risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk. Investor fear is proxied 
by the VXO, a volatility index compiled by the Chicago Board Options Exchange using S&P 
100 option prices, that represents a measure of the market’s expectation of stock volatility over 
the next 30 day period.16 Liquidity risk is proxied by year-on-year growth in US money supply 
                                                        
15 We do not count the exchange rate since, as noted above, it can be seen both as a push or a pull factor.  
16 The factors we consider are similar to those in Forbes and Warnock (2012). Data on the VIX that tracks the 
S&P 500 index instead is only available from 2003. As it is shown in Forbes and Warnock (2012), VIX and VXO 
are very similar. Due also to data constraints, we use growth of money supply instead of TED spread.  
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(M2) and the yield on 20-year US government bonds is used for the interest rate factor.  As pull 
factors, we consider the depth of the financial system (measured by each country's stock market 
capitalization divided by GDP), real GDP growth, country indebtedness (measured by public 
debt ratios) and capital controls (measured by Chinn-Ito indices). The data are obtained from 
DataStream.  The estimation of these ‘structural’ state-space models is conducted over the full 
period due to the degrees-of-freedom constraint imposed by the large number of push/pull 
factors. The results (unreported for space constraints but available upon request) affirm that 
considering this distinct set of push/pull factors makes no meaningful difference to the findings. 
The temporary component in bank credit flows remains responsible for most of the variation 
in the bank credit flows; which is likely to reflect (as we saw earlier) the new dynamics in the 
post-1997 era.   
6. Conclusions 
Motivated by the dramatic increase in international capital flows in recent years, particularly 
in cross-border bank credit flows which reached 60% of global GDP during 2000-2007, this 
paper re-examines the role of hot money in bank credit and portfolio flows. We deploy state-
space models à la Kalman filter to evaluate the relative size of the permanent component and 
temporary or ‘hot money’ component of the flows from the US to emerging markets (EMs) 
over the period 1988 to 2012. A key question we address is whether the degree of temporariness 
or potential reversibility of bank flows from the US to EMs has increased in recent years 
coinciding with the banking globalisation process.  
A key result is that bank credit flows from the US to EMs have undergone a dramatic 
change from being predominantly permanent during the 1990s to being mainly temporary (or 
reversible) thereafter. This finding is robust to the inclusion of push and pull factors in the state-
space decomposition, an estimation approach not used before in the literature on international 
capital flows. Our investigation confirms extant evidence that portfolio flows (but not bank 
credit flows) played a major role in the Asian Financial Crisis. The same state-space models 
applied to recent data suggest high temporariness of all three types of capital flows in the new 
century or equivalently, that all of them have been ‘flooded’ by hot money. Therefore it appears 
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that bank credit flows are as ‘worrying’ as equity flows for risk managers. 
The findings represent tentative evidence that hot money in bank credit and portfolio flows 
may have been a potential channel via which the Subprime Crisis in the US evolved into a 
global financial crisis.17 Thus our analysis indirectly supports the conjecture that bank lending 
played a key role in the late 2000s GFC transmission of which Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) 
provide direct evidence from a different methodology. Moreover, the findings endorse the 
renewed interest by policymakers in using regulations, sometimes camouflaged as prudential 
banking regulations, to manage international capital flows, with the tacit approval of the IMF 
(Ostry et al., 2010; McCauley, 2010). An important question that this paper does not address is 
what type of bank credit is most responsible for the observed change from persistence to 
temporariness in the recent decade. Data limitations at the time of writing preclude us from 
pursuing it. We leave this work for further research. 
 
 
  
                                                        
17 It is likely that various other direct channels (such as trade) and/or indirect channel (such as wake-up calls) may 
also have played an important role in turning the US housing slump into the GFC.  
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Table I. Descriptive statistics 
The table reports minimum, mean, maximum, and standard deviation (S.D.) of CPI-scaled capital flows in US$ millions. The last column reports the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test statistic for the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) behaviour versus stationarity; the test regression includes a constant and linear time trend 
and the augmentation lag order is selected with the modified AIC (Ng and Perron, 2001).  * and ** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values. The sampling frequency is quarterly for bank flows and monthly for equity and bond flows over the period 1988 to 2012. 
  
  
Min Mean Max S.D.
ADF 
test
Min Mean Max S.D.
ADF 
test
Min Mean Max S.D.
ADF 
test
Mainland -1164.10 -141.23 -3.63 198.83 -3.43 -13.84 0.09 21.16 2.47 -7.45 ** 0.01 119.35 524.81 113.39 -4.11 **
Taiwan China -185.87 -89.48 -43.18 33.44 -2.96 -15.87 0.90 37.40 4.42 -5.73 ** -0.45 25.95 105.09 17.32 -3.41
India -158.05 -29.58 34.41 33.08 -1.75 -12.31 0.35 11.33 1.62 -4.21 ** 0.00 5.35 57.11 8.15 -2.57
Indonesia -143.43 -30.30 10.43 34.61 -2.57 -1.69 0.13 2.58 0.50 -1.96 -0.25 6.89 44.93 7.37 0.67
South Korea -67.25 19.65 86.72 29.30 -3.94 * -7.76 0.66 9.07 2.03 -4.71 ** 0.01 41.02 136.85 36.70 -2.57
Malaysia -22.43 -6.41 10.54 4.66 -2.34 -2.72 0.15 3.39 0.69 -4.09 ** -0.74 11.46 105.11 10.91 -3.82 *
Pakistan -36.69 -6.92 4.42 8.34 -4.35 ** -0.37 0.02 0.79 0.11 -4.94 ** 0.00 0.12 4.05 0.34 -8.17 **
Philippines -49.78 -8.81 9.53 10.95 -0.76 -1.24 0.05 1.39 0.22 -5.35 ** 0.02 6.43 32.27 6.46 -1.57
Thailand -212.12 -42.79 1.34 47.21 0.00 -1.65 0.10 1.98 0.42 -2.39 0.02 9.63 41.69 7.35 -4.45 **
Average -226.64 -37.32 12.29 44.49 -6.38 0.27 9.90 1.39 -0.15 25.13 116.88 23.11
Total -2039.72 -335.87 110.59 400.43 -57.44 2.46 89.08 12.48 -1.38 226.20 1051.91 207.99
Argentina -74.63 -28.22 65.25 26.55 -3.13 -4.60 0.03 9.49 0.94 -4.02 ** -0.46 13.53 106.07 18.95 -2.41
Brazil -136.03 40.97 257.07 82.54 -2.79 -9.85 1.56 41.56 4.03 -3.13 -0.26 61.23 383.67 58.74 -2.32
Chile -48.46 -0.20 33.96 16.77 -2.51 -4.51 -0.02 4.37 0.83 -4.66 ** 0.03 11.66 62.12 12.28 -3.42
Colombia -74.12 -13.14 25.65 21.25 -2.88 -2.12 -0.02 2.24 0.35 -6.15 ** 0.00 9.66 49.83 9.00 -1.34
Ecuador -15.99 -6.39 10.24 6.74 -2.26 -1.72 -0.02 2.46 0.24 -4.90 ** -0.43 1.16 7.82 1.37 -3.18
Jamaica -5.09 -1.72 1.45 1.22 -2.81 -0.74 -0.01 0.10 0.06 -5.86 ** 0.00 1.29 9.47 1.70 -2.29
Mexico -202.68 -74.74 115.92 75.64 -3.88 * -7.17 -0.07 11.71 2.28 -7.03 ** 0.02 38.90 171.50 29.13 -5.40 **
Uruguay -43.08 -17.25 -4.49 10.44 -4.64 ** -1.21 -0.09 1.90 0.22 -13.90 ** 0.02 5.58 31.63 4.94 -2.58
Venezuela -138.37 -85.12 14.22 35.76 -1.21 -2.41 -0.04 4.06 0.48 -9.55 ** -0.23 4.88 30.20 3.94 -6.36 **
Average -82.05 -20.64 57.70 30.77 -3.81 0.14 8.66 1.05 -0.15 16.43 94.70 15.56
Total -738.45 -185.80 519.27 276.91 -34.32 1.30 77.90 9.42 -1.32 147.88 852.32 140.05
Net bank credit flows
Panel A: Asia
Panel B: Latin America
Gross bond flowsNet Equity flows
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Figure I. Evolution of net capital flows  
The graphs plot the time-series of CPI-scaled net equity flows, net bond flows and net bank credit flows 
from the US to Asian and Latin American countries on average. The vertical axis is US$ millions and the 
horizontal axis are quarters. The sample period is from 1988 to 2012 and the observations are quarterly. 
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Table II. State-space model for bank credit flows.  
For each country, quarterly bank credit flows scaled by CPI scaled are used to estimate the state-space models 
listed in Appendix D. The best specification is selected using the R2 and AIC criteria. A dash indicates that the 
component at hand is absent from the model. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of the each component 
over the largest standard deviation across components, computed from the variance-covariance matrix of 
disturbances. Column five reports the final level of the stochastic trend and its root mean square error (RMSE); 
* and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level. The last column reports the p-value of the 
Ljung–Box test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel A: First subperiod 1988Q1-1997Q4
Mainland China 1 1.000 0.652  -110.151 [17.443]**  0.702 0.995
Taiwan China 1 1.000 0.374  -91.325 [18.134]**  0.926 0.466
India 1 1.000 0.449  -15.331 [1.109]**  0.696 0.945
Indonesia 1 1.000 0.000  -132.984 [18.646]**  0.957 0.808
South Korea 1 1.000 0.000  41.923 [41.923]**  0.875 0.098
Malaysia 6 1.000 0.001  -6.340 [0.0124]**  0.633 0.449
Pakistan 1 1.000 0.695  -3.969 [1.053]**  0.518 0.084
Philippines 1 1.000 0.744  -8.894 [1.647]**  0.852 0.213
Thailand 1 1.000 0.000  -29.453 [0.000]**  0.873 0.059
Argentina 1 1.000 0.426  -76.001 [4.696]**  0.897 0.181
Brazil 1 1.000 0.000  -56.080 [0.001]**  0.941 0.079
Chile 1 1.000 0.000  30.754 [0.000]**  0.884 0.080
Colombia 1 1.000 0.000  25.732 [0.000]**  0.926 0.737
Ecuador 2 1.000 0.377 0.000 -5.169 [0.401]** 0.064 0.893 0.863
Jamaica 1 1.000 0.505  -0.487 [0.185]**  0.787 0.155
Mexico 1 1.000 0.040  -100.012 [0.970]**  0.835 0.629
Uruguay 1 1.000 0.000 - -12.818 [0.000]**  0.692 0.827
Venezuela 1 1.000 0.000  -140.947 [0.000]**  0.939 0.362
Panel B: Extended period 1988Q1-2012Q4
Mainland China 2 0.217 0.756 1.000 -209.669 [83.536]* 0.734 0.927 0.272
Taiwan China 2 0.000 0.134 1.000 -132.426 [32.229]** 0.960 0.870 0.122
India 2 0.200 0.345 1.000 -27.084 [12.913]* 0.689 0.966 0.186
Indonesia 4 0.149  1.000 -58.136 [ 27.533]* 0.925 0.916 0.289
South Korea 2 0.000 0.118 1.000 24.789 [9.893]* 0.761 0.547 0.080
Malaysia 4 0.645  1.000 7.050 [3.015]* 0.463 0.539 0.171
Pakistan 2 0.877 0.819 1.000 -27.665 [2.793]** 0.560 0.870 0.066
Philippines 4 0.629  1.000 -16.548  [6.247]** 0.515 0.902 0.549
Thailand 2 0.208 0.214 1.000 -51.794 [16.458]** 0.820 0.976 0.123
Argentina 9 0.000  1.000 -524.585 [74.256]** 0.929 0.858 0.647
Brazil 9 0.000  1.000 -294.688 [77.563]** 0.902 0.719 0.102
Chile 9 0.281  1.000 -27.039 [13.628]* 0.936 0.917 0.216
Colombia 3 0.244 0.001 1.000 -30.110 [14.176]* 0.967 0.976 0.266
Ecuador 9 0.000  1.000 -23.441 [2.119]** 0.922 0.641 0.409
Jamaica 1 0.662 1.000  -3.017 [0.476]**  0.660 0.115
Mexico 4 0.630  1.000 -179.836 [23.720]** 0.632 0.914 0.937
Uruguay 4 0.757  1.000 -49.499 [2.273]** 0.236 0.939 0.607
Venezuela 4 0.518  1.000 -73.042 [15.614]** 0.771 0.950 0.142
Q -ratios 
Temporary Ljung-Box        
test
R
2
AR 
persistence
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
ModelCountry
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(Cont.) 
 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel C: Recent period 1998Q1-2012Q4
Mainland China 5 0.081  1.000 -328.149 [147.798]* 0.815 0.765 0.463
Taiwan China 2 0.362 0.469 1.000 -163.056 [20.599]** 0.861 0.729 0.072
India 6 0.614 1.000  -103.219 [35.785]**  0.732 0.405
Indonesia 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 -46.832 [ 22.816]* 0.898 0.846 0.059
South Korea 1 0.767 1.000  48.021 [15.835]**  0.290 0.168
Malaysia 1 0.749 1.000  -11.699 [5.645]*  0.846 0.394
Pakistan 1 0.709 1.000  -12.363 [4.312]**  0.897 0.617
Philippines 1 0.951 1.000  -18.523 [7.382]**  0.900 0.770
Thailand 6 0.915 1.000  -129.524 [23.901]**  0.814 0.574
Argentina 4 0.000  1.000 -49.602 [8.715]** 0.907 0.840 0.823
Brazil 10 0.308  1.000 230.677 [98.202]* 0.934 0.140 0.295
Chile 4 0.336  1.000 -28.034 [14.530]* 0.889 0.866 0.570
Colombia 9 0.000  1.000 -78.464 [8.285]** 0.772 0.850 0.277
Ecuador 9 0.596  1.000 -21.646 [1.261]** 0.664 0.291 0.248
Jamaica 1 0.712 1.000  -3.034 [0.528]**  0.271 0.125
Mexico 2 0.313 0.000 1.000 -191.204 [20.043]** 0.488 0.598 0.672
Uruguay 4 0.716  1.000 -49.533 [2.797]** 0.217 0.905 0.478
Venezuela 2 0.000 0.248 1.000 -139.920 [4.797]** 0.719 0.429 0.071
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
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Table III. State-space model for net equity flows.  
For each country, monthly CPI-scaled equity flows are used to estimate the state-space model specifications 
listed in Appendix D. The best specification is selected using the R2 and AIC criteria. A dash indicates that the 
component at hand is absent from the model. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of the each component 
over the largest standard deviation across components, computed from the variance-covariance matrix of 
disturbances. Column five reports the final level of the stochastic trend and its root mean square error (RMSE); 
* and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level.  The last column reports the p-value of the 
Ljung–Box test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel A: First subperiod 1988M1-1997M12
Mainland China 6 0.000 1.000 - 0.195 [0.059]** - 0.510 0.091
Taiwan China 1 0.213 1.000 - -0.292 [0.099]** - 0.541 0.071
India 1 0.181 1.000 - 0.455 [0.048]** - 0.772 0.076
Indonesia 1 0.064 1.000 - 0.250 [0.098]** - 0.047 0.293
South Korea 2 0.179 0.000 1.000 0.846 [0.170]** 0.846 0.886 0.254
Malaysia 2 0.000 0.472 1.000 0.115 [0.061]* 0.461 0.143 0.202
Pakistan 6 0.732 1.000 - -0.165 [0.047]** - 0.116 0.139
Philippines 1 0.116 1.000 - 0.083 [0.049]* - 0.415 0.138
Thailand 1 0.000 1.000 - 0.034 [0.014]* - 0.501 0.499
Argentina 1 0.361 1.000 - -0.435 [ 0.194]* - 0.705 0.190
Brazil 1 0.082 1.000 - 0.975 [0.285]** - 0.077 0.090
Chile 1 0.318 1.000 - 0.775 [0.162]** - 0.653 0.840
Colombia 1 0.684 1.000 - -0.473 [0.068]** - 0.901 0.354
Ecuador 1 0.322 1.000 - -0.018 [0.006]** - 0.848 0.767
Jamaica 1 0.128 1.000 - -0.080 [0.024]** - 0.575 0.872
Mexico 1 0.186 1.000 - 2.646 [0.717]** - 0.852 0.122
Uruguay 1 0.083 1.000 - -0.165 [0.058]** - 0.012 0.826
Venezuela 1 0.113 1.000 - -0.137 [0.044]** - 0.820 0.985
Panel B: Extended period 1988M1-2012M12
Mainland China 6 0.217 1.000 - 1.702 [0.843]** - 0.896 0.180
Taiwan China 7 0.027 0.440 1.000 4.857 [1.091]** 0.450 0.896 0.665
India 1 0.292 1.000 - -2.653 [0.991]** - 0.801 0.164
Indonesia 6 0.150 1.000 - 0.894 [0.096]** - 0.851 0.206
South Korea 2 0.000 1.000 0.837 0.643 [0.319]* 0.888 0.193 0.251
Malaysia 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.139 [0.055]** 0.296 0.307 0.085
Pakistan 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.019 [0.008]* 0.346 0.278 0.111
Philippines 2 0.000 1.000 0.653 0.062  [0.026]** - 0.306 0.285
Thailand 7 0.057 0.822 1.000 0.147 [0.134]** 0.358 0.708 0.368
Argentina 7 0.176 0.000 1.000 -0.926 [0.298]* 0.248 0.929 0.099
Brazil 2 0.079 1.000 0.924 2.690 [0.788]** 0.770 0.711 0.640
Chile 6 0.153 1.000 - 0.935 [0.258]** - 0.727 0.119
Colombia 7 0.000 1.000 0.621 -0.113 [0.054]* 0.674 0.535 0.150
Ecuador 6 0.049 1.000 - -0.051 [0.018]** - 0.921 0.066
Jamaica 1 0.103 1.000 - -0.047 [0.011]** - 0.782 0.798
Mexico 7 0.000 0.849 1.000 -1.259 [0.398]** 0.564 0.351 0.140
Uruguay 1 0.031 1.000 - -0.157 [0.037]** - 0.032 0.559
Venezuela 1 0.076 1.000 - -0.155 [0.045]** - 0.888 0.617
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
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(Cont.) 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel C: Recent 1998M1-2012M12
Mainland China 1 0.332 1.000 - 5.544 [1.298]** - 0.790 0.398
Taiwan China 2 0.000 0.864 1.000 0.661 [0.298]** 0.689 0.886 0.522
India 7 0.347 1.000 0.752 5.392 [1.115]** 0.619 0.811 0.077
Indonesia 1 0.081 1.000 - 0.615 [0.112]** - 0.470 0.133
South Korea 1 0.291 1.000 - -4.466 [1.542]** - 0.393 0.977
Malaysia 1 0.327 1.000 - 4.676 [0.678]** - 0.434 0.051
Pakistan 2 0.188 0.000 1.000 0.275 [0.057]** 0.411 0.774 0.053
Philippines 1 0.346 1.000 - -0.362 [0.138]** - 0.483 0.271
Thailand 6 0.224 1.000 - 0.922 [0.151]** - 0.642 0.225
Argentina 2 0.000 1.000 0.000 -1.705 [0.427]** 0.281 0.856 0.108
Brazil 2 0.090 1.000 0.900 3.005 [1.515]** - 0.179 0.163
Chile 1 0.122 1.000 - 0.855 [0.304]** - 0.438 0.159
Colombia 1 0.000 1.000 - -0.063 [0.031]** - 0.005 0.098
Ecuador 1 0.000 1.000 - -0.025 [0.010]** - 0.736 0.967
Jamaica 1 0.000 1.000 - -0.020 [0.002] - 0.784 0.400
Mexico 7 0.000 0.977 1.000 -1.231 [0.527]** 0.626 0.386 0.106
Uruguay 6 0.000 1.000 - -0.171 [0.032]** - 0.364 0.060
Venezuela 1 0.050 1.000 - -0.152 [0.060]** - 0.776 0.061
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
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Table IV. State-space model for gross bond flows.  
For each country, monthly CPI-scaled gross bond flows are used to estimate the state-space model specifications 
listed in Appendix D. The best specification is selected using the R2 and AIC criteria. A dash indicates that the 
component at hand is absent from the model. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of the each component 
over the largest standard deviation across components, computed from the variance-covariance matrix of 
disturbances. Column five reports the final level of the stochastic trend and its root mean square error (RMSE); 
* and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level. The last column reports the p-value of the 
Ljung–Box test for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation.  
 
 
 
  
Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel A: First subperiod 1988M1-1997M12
Mainland China 2 0.125 0.000 1.000 56.353 [6.514]** 0.625 0.851 0.378
Taiwan China 6 0.000 1.000 - 32.706 [8.494]** - 0.847 0.066
India 2 0.052 0.374 1.000 1.255 [0.477]** 0.875 0.592 0.409
Indonesia 2 0.149 0.350 1.000 8.311 [2.681]** 0.878 0.679 0.609
South Korea 1 0.470 1.000 - 18.027 [1.800]** - 0.596 0.572
Malaysia 1 0.894 1.000 - -32.311 [7.135]** - 0.885 0.120
Pakistan 9 0.000 - 1.000 0.095 [0.032]** 0.170 0.432 0.996
Philippines 1 0.823 1.000 - 4.936 [0.672]** - 0.666 0.108
Thailand 2 0.156 0.419 1.000 10.382 [2.525]** 0.755 0.610 0.421
Argentina 6 0.262 1.000 - 19.252 [6.335]** - 0.767 0.183
Brazil 1 0.785 1.000 - 96.726 [7.976]** - 0.868 0.678
Chile 1 0.457 1.000 - 5.934 [1.056]** - 0.334 0.066
Colombia 1 0.164 1.000 - 7.193 [0.753]** - 0.476 0.130
Ecuador 6 0.074 1.000 - 0.567 [0.212]** - 0.930 0.361
Jamaica 1 0.146 1.000 - 0.392 [0.064]** - 0.150 0.532
Mexico 1 0.722 1.000 - 25.710 [4.444]** - 0.558 0.508
Uruguay 1 0.577 1.000 - 12.381 [0.975]** - 0.675 0.317
Venezuela 1 0.434 1.000 - 11.501 [1.234]** - 0.448 0.363
Panel B: Extended period 1988M1-2012M12
Mainland China 2 0.241 1.000 0.825 277.109 [30.250]** 0.850 0.793 0.078
Taiwan China 7 0.000 0.821 1.000 41.921 [11.590]** 0.964 0.533 0.066
India 2 0.123 0.309 1.000 11.416 [3.091]** 0.443 0.862 0.058
Indonesia 1 0.520 1.000 - 32.085 [1.960]** - 0.708 0.097
South Korea 2 0.335 0.845 1.000 103.788 [8.413]** 0.570 0.547 0.112
Malaysia 2 0.523 0.000 1.000 36.452 [5.844]** 0.356 0.764 0.729
Pakistan 2 0.046 0.491 1.000 0.155 [0.073]* 0.733 0.672 0.115
Philippines 6 0.437 1.000 - 24.261  [2.285]** - 0.491 0.113
Thailand 1 0.361 1.000 - 6.277 [2.673]** - 0.372 0.221
Argentina 1 0.968 1.000 - 18.128 [9.097]* - 0.979 0.077
Brazil 1 0.346 1.000 - 155.919 [13.396]** - 0.749 0.484
Chile 4 0.400 - 1.000 41.209 [ 2.902]* 0.123 0.782 0.063
Colombia 1 0.338 1.000 - 33.785 [1.768]* - 0.812 0.113
Ecuador 1 0.444 1.000 - 1.729 [0.454]** - 0.525 0.068
Jamaica 6 0.596 1.000 - -2.963 [1.038]** - 0.888 0.514
Mexico 1 0.139 1.000 - 74.416 [5.785]** - 0.650 0.484
Uruguay 6 0.626 1.000 - 22.875 [1.709]** - 0.678 0.689
Venezuela 1 0.208 1.000 - 5.061 [1.388]** - 0.184 0.229
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2 Ljung-Box        
test
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Permanent 
(stochastic trend) (irregular) (AR)
 t  t v t ρ 1 + ρ 2 
Panel C: Recent period 1998M1-2012M12
Mainland China 1 0.403 1.000 - 297.398 [31.369]** - 0.530 0.189
Taiwan China 7 0.000 0.901 1.000 43.320 [8.575]** 0.909 0.766 0.139
India 1 0.815 1.000 - 28.346 [2.617]** - 0.672 0.171
Indonesia 1 0.390 1.000 - 32.136 [2.121]** - 0.691 0.125
South Korea 1 0.521 1.000 - 105.803 [9.696]** - 0.602 0.054
Malaysia 1 0.556 1.000 - 10.476 [2.783]** - 0.502 0.478
Pakistan 1 0.303 1.000 - 0.035 [0.173] - 0.090 0.353
Philippines 1 0.951 1.000 - -18.523 [7.382]** - 0.900 0.770
Thailand 1 0.298 1.000 - 6.552 [2.945]** - 0.155 0.651
Argentina 1 0.943 1.000 - 6.666 [2.688]** - 0.842 0.058
Brazil 1 0.255 1.000 - 152.150 [14.760]** - 0.616 0.765
Chile 1 0.447 1.000 - 42.006 [3.475]** - 0.664 0.249
Colombia 1 0.359 1.000 - 33.898 [2.174]** - 0.656 0.254
Ecuador 1 0.544 1.000 - 1.730 [0.387]** - 0.517 0.622
Jamaica 1 0.412 1.000 - 0.699 [0.609] - 0.498 0.555
Mexico 1 0.108 1.000 - 73.413 [6.300]** - 0.374 0.717
Uruguay 1 0.362 1.000 - 16.366 [1.303]** - 0.599 0.151
Venezuela 1 0.147 1.000 - 5.181 [1.391]** - 0.014 0.155
Final level of stochastic trend 
component [RMSE]
AR 
persistence R
2
Ljung-Box        
test
Q -ratios 
Temporary 
Country Model
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Table V. State-space model with push and pull factors for bank credit flows from 1998Q1 to 2012Q4. 
The table reports estimates for the state-space Model 5 in Appendix D with pull and push factors in both components of net bank credit flows. The pull (domestic) 
factors are the short-term interest rate and MSCI equity price index of each EM. The push (global) factors are US short-term interest rate and MSCI US equity price 
index. The foreign exchange rate is included as pull factor but could be classified as either. Seasonally unadjusted short-term interest rates and foreign exchange rates 
are obtained from DataStream. All push and pull factors are entered as one-period lagged drivers. Bank credit flows are scaled by US core CPI. “+/-” denotes the 
expected direction of the impact of the driver on the capital flows. 0  Q-ratio  1 is the standard deviation of each component over the largest standard deviation across 
components. The root mean square error (RMSE) is reported in brackets; * and ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level.   The last column reports 
the p-value of the Ljung–Box test statistic for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation. The cross-section of countries is dictated by data availability. 
 
Perm. Temp. 
 t  t
Panel A: Asia
India 0.929 1.000 155.502 ** 0.022 ** -3.100 0.002 3.450 0.003 ** 2.062 ** -0.701 0.043 ** -1.555 ** -4.472 0.207 0.191
[2.325] [0.000] [0.051] [0.001] [0.444] [0.000] [0.060] [0.009] [0.003] [0.196] [0.149]
Malaysia 0.243 1.000 14.387 * 0.001 -0.176 -0.011 0.084 0.000 -0.199 -0.291 0.045 -0.893 -3.131 0.369 0.585
[0.805] [0.001 [0.218] [0.011] [1.004] [0.003] [0.667] [0.291] [0.026] [0.614] [9.489]
Philippines 0.202 1.000 -57.847 ** -0.007 0.752 -0.002 0.331 0.011 0.023 0.057 -0.011 -0.186 0.422 0.767 0.673
[0.951] [0.013] [1.081] [0.014] [1.723] [0.021] [0.577] [0.185] [0.038] [1.739] [0.890]
Thailand 0.813 1.000 -223.076 ** -0.012 ** 1.210 0.014 ** 2.343 0.024 ** -0.544 ** 0.179 -0.024 ** -1.470 ** 1.230 0.889 0.236
[1.522] [0.000] [0.044] [0.001] [0.146] [0.000] [0.073] [0.002] [0.005] [0.110] [0.075]
Argentina 0.202 1.000 -83.005 ** 0.009 -1.034 0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.227 -2.666 -0.002 -0.047 7.319 0.182 0.328
[1.574] [0.005 [0.866] [0.011] [1.442] [0.001] [0.153] [1.032] [0.002] [0.202] [6.675]
Brazil 0.391 1.000 -142.268 ** 0.063 ** -11.078 -0.004 0.218 -0.007 0.788 -19.915 0.041 * -0.827 10.725 0.889 0.762
[10.058] [0.015] [4.361] [0.082] [9.477] [0.005] [2.182] [10.418] [0.018] [2.285] [13.373]
Chile 0.340 1.000 172.306 ** -0.010 1.344 -0.012 -0.273 0.003 -0.096 0.373 -0.006 -0.630 -6.596 0.426 0.256
[2.376] [0.017] [1.529] [0.019] [2.447] [0.004] [0.632] [1.649] [0.009] [1.283] [4.997]
Mexico 0.202 1.000 -151.468 ** -0.027 -0.668 -0.083 9.512 0.003 ** 1.245 0.689 0.012 -2.267 4.085 0.461 0.311
[3.802] [0.001] [1.957] [0.071] [4.452] [0.001] [0.811] [1.358] [0.016] [2.092] [8.721]
Q -ratios Coefficients of push factors
R
2 Ljung-Box 
test
Temporary Permanent Temporary 
Coefficients of pull factors
EM       
interest rate
EM equity FX rate
(+) (+) (-)
** ** ** **
** ** **
*
**
**
Panel B: Latin America
Final level of 
stochastic 
trend 
(+) (-) (+) (-)
**
EM equity FX rate
(+) (+) (-)
US      
interest rate
US       
interest rate
US equity      US equity      
EM       
interest rate
Permanent 
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Appendix A. International capital form S and international capital form B. 
This appendix summarizes key information from the US Department of Treasury’s “Instructions for 
Preparation of Monthly Form S” and “Instructions for Preparation of Monthly Form B” available, at 
http://www.treas.gov/tic/forms-s.shtml and http://www.treas.gov/tic/forms-b.shtml, respectively. 
All banks, brokers, dealers (and other financial institutions) and individuals are by law required to report 
the value of any long-term security transactions involving a foreign resident. American Depositary Receipts 
(ADR) transactions are included. Securities transactions are reported on a transactions basis. Securities 
transactions are recorded by the nationality of the person with whom the transaction is carried, not by the 
country that originally issued the security. A foreigner is any individual, branch, partnership, association, 
corporation or other organization located outside the United States. Additionally, securities are recorded 
according to the residency of the issuer and not their currency denomination. 
The data collection system is specifically designed to capture US cross- border financial transactions for 
balance-of-payment purposes. That is, it is designed to capture only financial transactions that involve both a 
US resident and a foreign resident. Note that a US resident includes any individual, corporation, or organization 
located in the United States including branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates of foreign entities located in the 
United States. In addition, any corporation incorporated in the United States is considered a US resident even 
if it has no physical presence. Thus, a US branch of a Japanese bank is considered a US resident, and a London 
branch of a US bank is considered a foreign resident.  
The cross-border definition means that the data on foreign purchases of US securities include only those 
transactions that involve both a US seller and a foreign purchaser. Thus, these data exclude any US-to-US 
transactions, including, for example, transactions where the seller is a US securities broker and the purchaser 
is a US-based branch of a Japanese securities firm. They also exclude foreign-to-foreign transactions in 
securities, for example if a Japanese-resident securities broker purchases US Treasuries from a London-based 
securities broker. Because many US securities, including US Treasury securities, trade in foreign financial 
markets, the data will not capture all foreign transactions in US securities. 
These forms are the basis for the collection of data on purchases and sales of long-term securities, bank 
liabilities and bank claims by foreigners. The Treasury uses these data to provide timely and reliable 
information on international capital movements. This information is needed for preparation of the US capital 
accounts of the US balance-of-payment and the international investment position of the United States. These 
reports cover transaction by all banks, brokers, dealers, other financial institutions and individuals who carry 
transactions directly with foreigners. 
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for net bond flows. 
The table reports minimum, mean, maximum, and standard deviation (S.D.) of CPI-scaled net bond flows in 
US$ millions from 1988M1 to 2012M12. The last column reports the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
for the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary) behaviour against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity; 
the test regression includes a constant and linear time trend and the augmentation lag order is selected with the 
modified AIC criterion (Ng and Perron, 2001).  * and ** denote rejection at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, 
using the critical values tabulated by MacKinnon (1996).  
 
 
 
 
  
    
Min Mean Max S.D.
Mainland -170.05 -17.00 164.59 33.39 -2.89
Taiwan China -33.11 -3.76 31.99 8.70 -5.48 **
India -16.56 -0.19 14.68 2.98 -7.00 **
Indonesia -10.60 -0.07 11.40 2.67 -3.25
South Korea -29.13 -2.19 59.26 8.74 -5.27 **
Malaysia -19.74 -0.45 10.61 3.59 -3.96 **
Pakistan -0.41 0.04 4.01 0.29 -9.04 **
Philippines -11.19 -0.11 7.05 2.00 -3.88 *
Thailand -29.64 -0.47 21.05 4.10 -4.80 **
Average -35.61 -2.69 36.07 7.38
Total -320.45 -24.20 324.64 66.46
Argentina -21.36 -0.24 14.93 2.79 -15.09 **
Brazil -114.87 -2.97 92.67 16.46 -3.54 *
Chile -15.00 -0.46 9.78 2.70 -4.33 **
Colombia -13.18 -0.23 15.59 2.62 -4.54 **
Ecuador -2.48 -0.09 4.07 0.52 -3.39
Jamaica -1.04 -0.04 2.13 0.32 -3.97 *
Mexico -74.65 -1.33 51.69 10.58 -3.02
Uruguay -3.88 -0.23 5.46 1.07 -15.17 **
Venezuela -8.30 -0.09 25.17 2.61 -16.80 **
Average -28.31 -0.63 24.61 4.41
Total -254.75 -5.67 221.49 39.67
Net bond flows
Panel A: Asia
Panel B: Latin America
ADF test
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Appendix C. The Kalman-filter algorithm for state-space model estimation. 
With reference to model equations (7) and (8), the goal is to estimate the unobserved state vector t. Let 
t|t-1.denote the best linear mean-squared estimate of t  using all data up to time t-1. We can obtain t|t 
and its covariance matrix recursively via the Kalman-filter algorithm described by the equations 
| 1 1| 1  t t t tβ Fβ ,     
 
(A.1) 
 
| 1 1|
2
1P P     t t t tF F Q , 
 
(A.2) 
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where  
                 | 1 | 1 | 1t t t t t t t tE  
 
   
 
P β β β β , and    | | |t t t t t t t tE
 
   
 
P β β β β  
are the error covariance matrices for 1 t T  . The one-step-ahead prediction error, 𝑢𝑡|𝑡−1,  is used to 
perform the Ljung-Box test for no residual autocorrelation. More efficient estimates of the state vector 
and its error covariance matrix are obtained by using all information up to time T via the smoother 
| | 11| 1| 1 1 tT t tt T t t t    
   
 
β β J β Fβ  
(A.7) 
 
 1| 1| 1 1 | | 1 1t T t t t t T t t t       P P J P P J  
(A.8) 
1
1 1| 1 | 1t t t t t

   
J P F P  
(A.9) 
                                                  
which is computed by a backwards recursion for t = T-1, T-2 ,…, 1.  
The Kalman filter treats the model parameters as known. In practice, the parameters (entries of 
matrices H, F, R and Q) are unknown and need to be estimated. Gathered in α, the parameters can be 
estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function  
    t|t 1 t|t 1
1
| 1 | 1
1
1
|   const - ln det
2
t t t
T
t
t
L u u
 




    
   fα z,g f ,                (A.10) 
where 𝑢𝑡|𝑡−1  and 𝒇𝑡|𝑡−1 are both implicit functions of the unknown parameter vector α and are evaluated 
using the Kalman filter. Once the ML estimate of α has been obtained, one can compute the smoothed 
estimates of the state vector and its error covariance matrix via the Kalman filter and the full-sample 
smoother formalized above. The log-likelihood function can be maximized using numerical optimisation 
procedures (Cuthbertson et al., 1992, Ch. 2). We employ the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno quasi-
Newton algorithm (Harvey, 1989).  
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 Appendix D. Candidate state-space model specifications for capital flows. 
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